CLASSICAL WEEKLY

VOL. 36, TNO. 6

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BRIEF STUDIES IN ANCIENT WARFARE

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ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES



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CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION OF THE ATLANTIC STATES

Autumn Meeting

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1942 10:30 A.M.

HOTEL NEW YORKER, NEW YORK CITY

PROGRAM

Do the Classics Have a Place in Wartime Education?

Professor William C. Bagley, Columbia University, editor of School and Society

Report of the American Classical League on Classical Studies in War Time
Professor George Depue Hadzsits, University of Pennsylvania

The War Aims of the Pennsylvania State Association of Classical Teachers
Professor Franklin B. Krauss, Pennsylvania State College

Report of the Committee on the Classics and the War Effort Professor Ernst Riess, Hunter College

The Classics in a Changing World

Professor Karl Lehmann-Hartleben, New York University

The War and the World of Classical Thought
President George N. Shuster, Hunter College

President: Miss Edna White, Dickinson High School, Jersey City

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BRIEF STUDIES IN ANCIENT WARFARE

The Militia of the Late Roman Army

The army of Constantine differed from that of Augustus, not only in the number and size of its units and in their equipment, but in its strategic organization. In its simplest terms it consisted of garrison troops designed to hold a fortified limes supported by mobile units which could be brought up to any point of particular danger. The ideal, of course, was to prevent invasion altogether by stopping hostile forces at the frontier, but experience after Constantine as well as before proved that no system could do that permanently. Whatever were the tactical and financial advantages of the later arrangement, there was an obvious and great danger that the enemy might break through the limes before the mobile army could be brought into action. The cities in that case must take care of themselves, and even the barbarians' incapacity in siege warfare could not save cities which had no protection but a wall.

A very interesting light on this part of the military problem was contributed in 1904 by G. Manojlovic in a work on The Demos of Constantinople from 400 to 800 A-D-1 He demonstrated that the notorious Factions of the Circus, best remembered for riots which furnished excellent illustrations of degeneracy for moralists of Gibbon's school, but badly puzzled Byzantinists, were actually bodies of organized and armed militia on whom the defense of the city would devolve when the regular army was not available. This organization of the civil population makes explicable some of the heroic defenses recorded which must otherwise be considered simply miraculous, for it is certain that the system was general throughout the cities and not merely confined to the capital.

The military development of the empire is so constant, so complicated and so ill documented that it is often quite impossible to date the appearance of features of the greatest importance. Many of the reforms traditionally assigned to the genius of Constantine have lately been confidently claimed for the genius of Diocletian. But it is beginning to be apparent that much of the system of the fourth century was already in process of formation in the first half of the third. The evidence from Dura-Europos has proved that the Duces of Diocletian had their forerunners before 245 A.D.,² and I believe that the same site gives evidence for the use of citizen militia at that time. Into the general probabilities of the case I will not go here; the conclusive point is the great abundance of arms and armor

discovered in private houses throughout the city. Some of this might be attributed to soldiers in billet, but, since the military forces had their own special quarter, that explanation will not suffice. The citizens themselves must have possessed arms, and it needs no argument that in a frontier town that would only be permissible if they were recognized as a regular part of the city's defense. There is nothing as yet to connect this militia with the Blues and Greens, unless the discovery of a small hippodrome at Dura should be so interpreted, but we may be confident that before the middle of the third century the government of the empire had recognized the use of civilian auxiliaries to the regular forces.

ALFRED R. BELLINGER

YALE UNIVERSITY

The Ancient War Correspondent

When we consider the truly marvelous work of the war correspondent1 in the present war, with its worldwide scope, its imminent risk of death, wounding, disease, capture, starvation, we often wonder what the conditions of war reporting were in former days, perhaps even under what circumstances the art was developed. We need not search long for its beginnings. It follows history by about a half century; in fact, even history writing developed as chiefly a permanent record of wars. Herodotus' last three books, containing his monograph on the Second Persian War, dated perhaps about 450 B.C., represent the beginning of history writing, but not of war reporting, for a boy of four or five cannot be considered a war correspondent, no matter how much the experiences of his earliest boyhood may fire his imagination. Thucydides was a contemporary of the events he describes, and greatly developed the art of history writing, but certain artificialities, such as the use of the general's battle harangue to place the issues of the campaign before the reader, keep him off the list of war correspondents.

Three lesser historians, however, clearly in spirit and reality war correspondents, show the development of the art through five centuries. Clearly too, they were more than war correspondents, for all three were generals playing important rôles in the scenes they depicted. These three are Xenophon the Athenian, who wrote of Iraq and Anatolia, Aristobulus the Macedonian, who wrote of India, and Josephus the Jew who wrote of his native Palestine.

Why the correspondent? What did he write? How

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¹ This brief and a similar treatment of the topic in the November 1942 issue of The Educational Leader, published by the Kansas State Teachers College, Pittsburg, Kansas, are based on a paper read before the Classical Association of Kansas and Western Missouri at William Jewel College, April 11, 1942.

¹ This study, written in Serbian and almost unknown, was made available to scholars by the characteristic generosity and industry of Henri Grégoire, who published a French translation in Byzantion XI (1936) 618-716.

² J. F. Gilliam, "The *Dux Ripae* at Dura," TPAPhA 72 (1941) 157-75.

did he send back news? In what form is it now extant, if preserved? How honest was he? How about censorship?

The first question nearly answers itself, for it merely is human nature to desire immortality of fame in letters. Cyrus the Younger, Alexander, Vespasian and Titus wanted their deeds known, both as current news and as a permanent record. The work of two of our correspondents comes to us as a finished product, for both had the leisure to put it into final form. The work of the third is entirely incorporated into later general and special works. In contrast, the work of the present-day correspondent, aside from covering only a minute portion of our world-wide battle fronts, comes to us hourly or daily or weekly, produced under tremendous pressure, so that it can never be a five-act literary unit like Xenophon's Anabasis I, his Agesilaus, or Josephus' Jewish Wars.

Environment considered, each was the best of his time. Xenophon was not only the friend of Proxenus, Cyrus' general, who himself had paid money to Gorgias of Leontini, but had had considerable rhetorical training in the schools at Athens and had proved himself as a history writer. He merely hints at the relation in quoting Proxenus' invitation: " . . . and promised him that if he should come he would make him a friend to Cyrus, who, he said, would be better to him than his native land." Although he himself became the directing general after Cyrus' death, Xenophon wrote modestly of his own accomplishments, yet revealed himself as a magnetic speaker, a capable commander, an inventive strategist, a strictly pious Greek. In connection with Agesilaus' mercenary soldiering in Asia, Xenophon is frankly laudatory, not only in the biography, the Agesilaus, but also in the parallel portions of the Hellenica. Xenophon writes plainly, accurately, truthfully. His pay? He undoubtedly made some money campaigning, but he must have bought his estate at Scillus in Elis, where he wrote the Cyropaedia and trained dogs and horses, largely from his honorarium for the Agesilaus.

Aristobulus of Cassandreia in Macedonia was one of Alexander's generals (which assured adequate pay), and was the most successful, in a literary way, of the ten or more literary Greeks whom Alexander took with him on his Indian campaign. The chief place where we may be reasonably sure of Aristobulus' style is the account by the uncritical Diodorus Siculus of the portion of the campaign which followed the execution of Callisthenes, Aristotle's nephew, in 327, for the careful Arrian, our best authority on Alexander, omits most of the rhetoric. From a hint by the brilliant Lucian, "killing elephants with a single stroke," we turn our attention to the massive, high-spirited Porus, to the Homeric aristeia inside the citadel of the city of the Malli, to the pseudotheomachia of Ares-Coragus and Hercules-Dioxippus.

From a study of these chapters we may confidently characterize Aristobulus as epic in sweep, over-rhetorical in his detailed descriptions, very fond of exaggeration and fulsome flattery. Alexander outfights Achilles, outtravels Bacchus.

At Jotapata in Galilee, in the year 67 A.D., after the slaughter or suicide of the ten thousand inhabitants, an unkempt prisoner is brought before the Roman governor Vespasian. From the cave beside the town well has come the general Josephus, who had taxed all the strength and ingenuity of the Romans for many days. Now he comes not as a simple prisoner but as a Hebrew prophet, "Hail thou! destined to rule the world, thou and thy son!" Soon he wins the favor of Vespasian, and especially of his son Titus. He almost immediately becomes a Roman spokesman, later a resident of the imperial palace at Rome, and finally a Flavius.

As Roman spokesman Josephus was with Titus on that Passover day of 70 A.D. when the Romans invested Jerusalem and personally made the demand for surrender. He describes in vivid contrast the magnificent review of the Roman army, with the legions dazzling in gold, silver and purple and, on the other hand, the ruthless driving back of the starving Jews who were seeking grass roots to eat outside the walls, and the interminable catalogue of intolerable horrors inside the walls, while the sights and sounds of the actual final assault beggar description.

Throughout antiquity, censorship, though indirect, was very effective: Xenophon probably received most of his wealth from his favorable reports on Agesilaus. Aristobulus wrote encomiastically of Alexander's progess, including many parallels with the Iliad and with the myth of Bacchus; further, he had the fate of Callisthenes as a warning. Josephus, to prove his pro-Roman attitude, wrote fulsomely of Herod the Great at Jericho, who had stripped for his bath when twenty armed Jews fled from their hiding places in terror. In all three cases the proper application of psychology to the handling of one's patron meant wealth, to Aristobulus and Josephus life itself-

Xenophon had very little opportunity for communication with the home country, although Cyrus may have used in part the royal Persian messenger system. Aristobulus could send more frequent messages, in spite of the much greater distance, for Alexander kept in close touch with the source of supplies and recruits. Josephus, using Rome's system of paved roads, undoubtedly supplied the Greek versions of the Acta Diurna as posted in Athens, Syracuse, Antioch and Alexandria.

The literary excesses and excrescences of Aristobulus and Josephus found few imitators, but later generations have dealt kindly with the contents, organization and style of Xenophon's reports, for they have appealed to

the people as a whole. In Roman literature, Julius Caesar is the chief of Xenophon's followers, and Caesar's descriptive power is attested by the fifty-five days of thanksgiving which followed the receipt of three sets of his dispatches. Most writers of the American Civil War followed Xenophon closely, and some correspondents of the present war largely follow him as a model.

SAMUEL JAMES PEASE

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It is probable that no man will ever be able to explain why Rome, originally a little village surrounded by dozens of other little villages, came to be mistress of the earth while her neighbors remained—and remain today—mere dots on the map. If we may not solve this fascinating problem, we may at least approach it respectfully with speculation and suggestion, and I shall attempt to do so now.

For many years I have had a progressively growing conviction that no theory which seeks to account for Rome's swift climb to world power can successfuly disregard the assumption that in the early days there were somehow developed certain superb racial qualities and virtues which carried in them the seeds of future national greatness. To be sure there is no proof that these qualities and virtues existed; my contention is that, if they had not existed, Rome would have been in antiquity and would be today one with Veii and Antium, Nomentum and Fidenae.

In Tusculan Disputations 1.1.2, Cicero presents substantially this view, and in the list of ancestral traits at the close of the section *gravitas* stands first—and *gravitas* signifies 'morale'; that is to say, dogged perseverance, the unquenchable will to win, imperturbability in the face of difficulty and danger.

The best Latin authors are full of tales of early heroes. It seems rather futile and foolish to argue endlessly whether these tales are true or not; Romans of the time of Julius and of Augustus obviously believed them and by the same token made it easier for us to see quite clearly what they regarded as admirable in the character and achievements of their ancestors.

For the purpose of this note I have selected two graphic scenes from Livy.

In the summer of 390 B.C. ambassadorial vanity and stupidity aroused the anger of a band of marauding Gauls and sent them howling down the road to Rome. A hastily levied army met them at the Alia River, eleven miles from the city, and at the approach of the enemy flew in utter disorder—some, across the river to Veii, whence they sent no reassuring messages to their loved ones; a few, to the city. The streets resounded with lamentation; terror and confusion reigned supreme. "But," says Livy (5.39.5), "when it was announced

that the foe was at the gates, the State's peril wiped out all consideration of personal grief," and quite calmly and deliberately plans were made to garrison the citadel and the capitol and thus "to defend . . . gods and men and the name of Rome."

In 216 B.C. "dirus Hannibal" goaded a hot-headed Roman consul into battle. When the sun set on that June day at Cannae, many thousands of Romans lay dead on the field, but Varro escaped and eventually began his sorry journey back to Rome. "And even at such a time," Livy reports (22.61.14), "so high-souled was the State that the consul, returning from that unspeakable catastrophe of which he himself had been the chief cause, was met by throngs of citizens of all ranks who thanked him because he had not despaired of the Republic."

And so, in time, Rome came to be the ruler of the world.

HUBERT MCNEILL POTEAT

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The Influence of the Rays of the Sun and the Moon upon Battles

In a newspaper account of the fighting between the Germans and the British in Africa last summer a war correspondent made the following observation: "Marshal Rommel habitually attacks from the east in the morning, to have the sun in his enemy's eyes, and from the west in the afternoon, and so he did that day." 1

A paragraph in a later dispatch shows how both sides kept the direction of the sun in mind: "British tanks likewise are refueling, but the enemy seems powerless to interfere. He cannot do so in the morning, as the sun is in his eyes, preventing accurate fire. In the afternoon, however, it will be the other way around. The Germans will then start countershelling with 88-millimeter guns, as useful to them as the 25-pounders are to the British. No doubt they will take the same pleasure in our discomfiture as we now take in theirs."

Still another item speaks of "General Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck's crafty encircling attack on Marshal Rommel's rear when the Axis commander was using his customary tactic of attacking when the slanting rays of the setting sun were in the eyes of the defenders."³

Engaging the enemy when he is handicapped by the glare of the sun in his face and perhaps distressed by the heat is far from being a modern innovation. The generals of antiquity not only took advantage of such conditions, but planned and maneuvered in order to

¹The New York Times, June 3.

²Ibid. July 9.

³Ibid. July 4.

impose them on the enemy. At Pydna in 168 B.C. Aemilius Paulus refused to join battle with Perseus in the morning, while the rays of the hot sun were beating upon the faces of his own men. He wisely spent much of the day sitting in his tent as he waited for the sun to decline in the west.4

The sun played no small part in the outcome of the battle of Cannae. When it began the Romans were facing south and the Carthaginians north,5 with the sun looking on from one side, nonbelligerent and apparently neutral. Livy (22.46.8) is not sure whether the original alignment of the armies was due to chance or to design, but as the day and the struggle wore on the sun finally directed its shafts into the faces of the Romans. Seneca⁶ makes an explicit statement that in this battle, which he amusingly calls "pugna Romanis parum prospera," Hannibal conquered by aid of the wind (which was dust-laden, of course) and the blinding radiance of the sun. This explanation served as salve for Seneca's wounded pride, but history affords no better example of the tactical ability of a general.

In the terrible struggle at Vercellae the Cimbri were at a disadvantage because the sun shone directly in their faces, causing them to sweat profusely and to hold up their shields as a protection against its rays. Since they were used to a cold climate the heat sapped their strength.7 According to Frontinus,8 Marius planned the battle so that the Cimbri would be hindered by the glare of the sun as well as by wind and dust.

In view of events like these it does not seem strange to find in a Roman military manual a statement that the foresighted commander takes into his calculations the turning of the sun and the time when local winds

Engagements at sea have likewise been affected by the position of the sun. At the battle of Sluis, fought between the English and the French fleets in the estuary of the Zwin in 1340, the sun fell on the faces of the French seamen and prevented them from aiming with

Though the manual of Vegetius (3.14) notes the effect of dust, wind, and sun upon soldiers fighting in battle, it has nothing to say about a seemingly innocent, yet sometimes no less decisive, power-moonbeams. There is one glory of the sun and another of the moon.

During the night attack made by Pompey against Mithridates in 66 B.c. the moon threw its rays upon the faces of the foe and made them clear targets, whereas the Romans were veiled in baffling shadows.11 "The barbarians, thinking them near, would strike vainly into the air, and when they did come to close quarters in the shadow, they would be wounded when not expecting it. Thus many of them were killed and no fewer taken captives."12

While a nighttime battle between Vespasian's army and the Vitellians was still undecided the moon arose at the back of Vespasian's forces and projected the shadows of his men and horses so far forward that the enemy underestimated the distance and their weapons fell short. Like the Pontic array under similar circumstances, the Vitellians became clear marks for hostile weapons.13

Sometimes the fickle moon favored the soldiers upon whose faces and equipment her rays beamed. During the Athenian siege of Syracuse Demosthenes attacked Epipolae by night with the moon behind him. This circumstance played havoc with the morale of his men, since they could not see either their comrades or their flashing weapons in front of them and since the reflection of the moon's rays upon the shields of the enemy made them seem far more numerous and resplendent than they actually were.14

In the assault that Aratus made upon Corinth a curtain of clouds was drawn over the face of the moon and withdrawn as if acting in collusion with him. Taking over four hundred picked men Aratus led them against the gate of Corinth near the temple of Hera. The moon was full and the night cloudless, so that he feared the sentinels would detect their approach. Just as they were coming to the gate clouds from the sea enveloped the city and enabled them to scale the walls in secrecy. Marching through the city with the first hundred men Aratus began the slow, laborious ascent of the steep slopes of the citadel itself. They found it hard to keep to the path, but when they were at the most difficult place the clouds parted and the moon made the way clear. When they neared the wall at the desired spot the clouds obligingly closed again. While the rest of Aratus' forces were moving up the hill during the struggle that followed the moon came out again and shone upon their shields. Being in a long line they seemed to the enemy to be much more numerous than they really were and hence exercised an undue psychological influence upon them. In this exploit15 the

4Plutarch, Aem. Paul. 17.6. 5Polybius 3.114.8. Seneca, Nat. Quaest. 5.16.4, says that

the Romans were facing the rising sun.

6As cited in note 5.
7Plutarch, Mar. 26.4-5. See Livy 38.17.7 for a generalization about the depressing effect of the sun upon the spirits of

8Strat. 2.2.8. See also Plutarch, Mar. 26.4 and Polyaenus

9Vegetius 3.14. Cf. Polybius 1.48.8.

¹⁰Henry S. Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War, 1326-1347 (Ann Arbor 1929), 398-9.

¹¹Dio 36.49.6-8; Plutarch, Pomp. 32.5-6; Frontinus, Strat.

¹²E. Cary's translation of Dio 36.49.8 in the Loeb Classical

¹³Tacitus, Hist. 3.23.

¹⁴Plutarch, Nicias 21.8.

¹⁵Plutarch, Aratus 21.2.

weather uniformly favored Aratus, through no foresight of his own.

We have seen that the sun's rays still influence the conduct of battles. It is probable that changed conditions of warfare keep moonbeams from playing so important a part as they did in antiquity, but they could still affect favorably or adversely small parties or detachments engaging in hand-to-hand fighting.

EUGENE S. McCARTNEY

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Provisioning the Greeks at Troy

Walter Leaf in his fascinating book, Troy, a Study in Homeric Geography, easily persuades me to believe that the Greek method of campaign against the Trojans consisted in a long plan of attrition, of wearing out their enemies. By destroying the trade of the Trojans, the Greeks eventually diminished their means of livelihood. The Greeks at all times controlled the sea, while the Trojans controlled the Troad and the mainland, subject of course to the raids of the Greeks, particularly when these could use their ships to approach poorly fortified places near the coast. The Greeks meanwhile held a precarious foothold near the mouth of the Hellespont, unable to make a successful attack on Troy because of the strength of its fortifications, and unable to surround and starve out the Trojans because of their lack of numbers and the strength of the Trojan allies. How precarious the hold of the Greeks was is shown in the Fifteenth Book of the Iliad, where the Greeks are nearly thrust back into the sea, and the ships drawn up on the land are set afire. This is the highwater mark of the lost cause.

Eventually the Greeks did wear down the trade and commerce of Troy, and this policy was bringing results. In this way we account for the long and generally ineffectual warfare. At length, in the tenth year let us say, the Trojans are being reduced to desperation, while the Greeks are becoming tired of their ineffectiveness and plan more than once to give up the siege and go home. The result is the attack of the Trojans in force, which is so successful that the Greeks are forced back to their wall and even to the ships. But the battle turns; Achilles slays the leader of the Trojans; they begin to lose heart and after this events lead on to the capture of the city by treachery. The Greeks are rewarded for their grim tenacity.

My purpose in this brief article is to describe the way in which the Greeks got their supplies and provisioned themselves during the long period of their stay in a hostile country, when they occupied just enough of the plain to have their ships drawn up on the shore protected by a fortified camp, for the most part strong enough to keep the Trojans at a distance. There are several passages in the Iliad which give us the clue; and Thucydides in Book I gives us some interesting information on the subject, although we do not know from what source he derived it.

If the Trojans or their allies had any ships, they must have been bottled up in the Hellespont, or busy with the Black Sea trade. The Greeks would prevent any vessels from issuing from the Hellespont or going into it. On the other hand the Greeks had free movement for their vessels in the Aegean. As evidence that the allies of the Trojans had ships and used them, we have the story of Iphidamas, who was reared in Thrace. He came to the help of the Trojans with twelve ships. With these he came through the Propontis and the Hellespont as far as Perkote, which is well up the Hellespont in the Troad; after landing there he came to Troy on foot. This route was the only one possible when the entrance of the Hellespont was blocked. It is evident that communications were open for the Trojans and their allies above this barrier (Iliad 11.228ff.). So Lycaon, who was sold as a slave by Achilles in Lemnos, was ransomed and brought to Imbros, and thence forwarded to Arisbe (which is also well up the Hellespont), and from this place he came to Troy. He must have come through the Chersonese and crossed the Hellespont to Arisbe in order to reach the city (Iliad 21.40ff.).

Lemnos had been a stopping place of the Greeks on the way to Troy, and in a way it had become a base of operations for the Greeks (Iliad 8.23off.). It was also a convenient place to carry booty and dispose of captives as slaves (Iliad 21.40ff.). Samos, Imbros and Lemnos are mentioned in Iliad 24.753 as slave markets for the Greeks, where they might sell their captives. Thus is shown the frequent communication with these places and the opportunity for trade; a more specific evidence of their importation of supplies will appear later.

Grain was evidently brought to the Greeks from the Chersonese, as Thucydides shows in a most interesting passage (1.11). Thucydides rather belittles the Trojan war as a great undertaking of all Hellas. There was a lack of supplies and appliances for war. The Greeks expected to find their support in the country while carrying on their operations. Some victory was necessary as a preliminary to the occupation of the country. They did not use their whole force against Troy but turned a part of it to the cultivation of the Chersonese and to pillage, because of their need of food. I should not be at all surprised if they used captives as slave labor to produce the crops. In this way with Thucydides we may account for the long siege, the ten years of war. The Trojans were able to hold the Greeks in check in the Troad, close to the sea. If the Greeks had been able to use their whole force without diverting part of it to tillage and pillage, they might easily have won a battle, and by really besieging the city they might have taken Troy in less time and with less effort.

Forays, such as Achilles made on Thebe (Iliad 1.367ff.), were frequent. Achilles indeed had a great reputation for sacking towns (Iliad 9.328-9). On many of these expeditions, in addition to general booty, cattle must have been driven off in great numbers and thus good food was provided in abundance for the Greeks. We are always reading of their meals, sacrifices, and hecatombs; these Greeks were great eaters and took much pleasure in their food. The driving off of cattle was common enough in these ancient hostilities. Achilles in his threat to go home (Iliad 1.149ff.) speaks of it. Nestor's story of his early exploits is also interesting in this connection; it is the account of a border raid (Iliad 11.67off.).

Wine came from Thrace daily (Iliad 9.71-2). Lemnos also provides this essential of the daily fare. One of the most interesting passages of the poem describes the appearance of the wine fleet from Lemnos waiting off the Greek encampment, in the same way in which the rum fleet used to lie off Boston or New York harbor in the days of prohibition. The longhaired Achaeans got wine in exchange for bronze, iron, skins, cattle or slaves (Iliad 7.467ff.).

Our results are not very great; but we have found that the Greeks obtained their cattle by raids in the neighborhood of Troy, often among her allies; and grain from across the Hellespont, where their Service of Supply had grown it; and their wine by sea from Thrace and Lemnos, which was an important base of operations. The expedition was not a chance affair; it was well organized; and full measures were taken for provisioning adequately so large a force. The method was justified by the success of the Greeks.

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Not Always to the Swift

Blitzkrieg, the lightning war, modern symbol of terror, is in reality no novelty. Its basic principles of blinding speed, mobility and surprise have always been used by shrewd strategists to achieve victory. Great numbers of men are not necessary; a relatively few well organized, coordinated and equipped troops are sufficient, as is indicated by Robert Gueiroard, a young Frenchman who served in the tragic campaign of May-June, 1940, who writes (Bulletin of Harvard Business School Alumni Association, February, 1941):

Above all else, one supreme factor should be remembered: it took only 120,000 well-equipped, well-armed German soldiers to conquer all of France. They were the fighting men in the twelve mechanized German panzer divisions supported by a few thousand airplane pilots. The rest of the huge German army simply followed and occupied the territory which these mechanized troops had taken.

There are many ancient illustrations of this principle. In the first successful Persian invasion of Greece, the battle of Marathon (itself a proof of the superiority of an inferior number of well armed, well handled troops over a clumsy adversary) was made decisive by the astonishing speed of the Marathon men in returning to their posts in Athens, foiling the Persian plan against the city.

The battle of Salamis was a naval demonstration that these same principles of speed, flexibility and maneuverability will bring victory even over a foe vastly superior in numbers; while the very numbers, size and clumsiness of the Persians, together with their inability to adapt themselves to the conditions of battle, proved their undoing.

The Peloponnesian War, in basic principles and broad outline, shows a striking resemblance to the early phases of the present conflict. In 431 B.C. the forces of democracy, represented by Athens and her overseas empire, the Delian League, opposed the totalitarian bloc, Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies. Sparta, an inland country, had the best trained and largest army in Greece, but lacked a navy, except for the small Corinthian contingent; while Athens, the maritime and commercial state, controlled the seas with her navy, yet had only a small and relatively inefficient army. Behind her "Maginot Line" (the city walls connected by the Long Walls with the fortifications of the harbor Peiraeus) Athens was as impregnable to land attack as an island, and with command of the sea to protect her lines of communication and insure the safe arrival of food and supplies, she could not be starved out.

Thus Athenian strategy at the beginning of the war, as shaped by Pericles, was to maintain her naval supremacy and pursue a policy of blockade and exhaustion by "commando" raids on the seacoast and trade of the enemy. At the same time she must persistently avoid battle in the field or aggressive land campaigns. Such a defensive policy, which involved the abandonment of the countryside of Attica to the ravages of Spartan attacks, and the crowded concentration of the population within the city walls, naturally made the war and Pericles extremely unpopular with the people of Attica. But it was a necessary part of a plan which would surely have won eventually, provided only that it was rigidly maintained in all respects, and that the unity of the naval empire, with control of the sea and the trade routes, could be upheld.

The subsequent death of Pericles and change to an aggressive policy which ended in the disastrous Sicilian expedition and finally, in the last years, the intervention of Persia, which enabled Sparta to build a big navy and shift the war to a struggle for control of the eastern Aegean and the Hellespont, these things proved that the ultimate victory goes, as it did in the First World

War and will in the present one, to the nation which has mastery of the sea lanes.

Even this partial list of analogies and anticipations of modern warfare affords a strong temptation to paraphrase Terence and to say that, at least concerning warfare, nullumst iam factum quod non sit factum prius.

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Readers of these brief studies of ancient warfare and especially teachers, whose attention is currently turned often to parallels between that of the past and that of the present, will pass an instructive evening in a library with the following list of papers, mainly very brief, inspired by events of 1914-1918. The selection is that of three Pennsylvania readers, Miss Grace Hornauer of Cherry Tree, Miss Eileen Boyd of Ben Avon, and Dean Robert C. Horn of Allentown.

Abbott, Titus Labienus (The Classical Journal 13.4).
Armstrong, Caesar's Art of War (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 32.291); A New Approach to Caesar (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 31.222)

Bassett, An Ancient Case of 'Frightfulness' (CLASS-ICAL WEEKLY 10.49)

Born, Tanks and Roman Warfare (The Classical Journal 23,564)

Buenger, An Awkward Squad in B.C. 550 and Military Parallels (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 11.87)

Claffin, Caesar's Bridge and Modern Offensive-De-

fensive Strategy (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8.208)
Coulter, Caesar's Clemency (The Classical Journal

26.513)
Dennison The Appeal of Caesar (CLASSICAL

Dennison, The Appeal of Caesar (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 9.81)

Deutsch, Roman War Bread (The Classical Journal 13.527)

Englar, Second Year Latin and Some Aspects of the World War (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 12.99)

Foote, Ecce! Caesar Vivit (The Classical Journal 13.447)

Frank, Caesar at the Rubicon (The Classical Quarterly 1.223)

Geyser, Vexillum Stellatum (CLASSICAL WEEKLY

Hardesty, Caesar's Bridge (The Classical Journal 14.388)

Holmes, De Bello Gallico 4.28.2-3 (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10.156)

Horn, An Ancient Way to Conserve Food (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 11.96); An Interesting Parallel (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 9.24); Two Parallels between Ancient and Modern Warfare (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10.80)

Jefferson, Caesar and the Central Plateau of France (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 4.162)

Keith, Two Wars in Gaul (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8.42) Kent, Military Tactics of Caesar and of Today (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8.69); Parallels (CLASSICAL WEEK- LY 10.71; The Plutei to the Front (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8.136); Roman and Modern Military Highways (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10.88); The Turris Ambulatoria and the Perambulating 'Tank' (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10.48)

Knapp, Caesar B. G. 2.8 (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 10.161); Xenophon (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8.33)

Law, Atrocities in Greek Warfare (The Classical Journal 15,132)

MacVeagh, The Attack at Gergovia, a Case of the Limited Objective (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 21.177)

McCartney, Ancients and the War (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 11.142; 12.129); The Genesis of Rome's Military Equipment (CLASICAL WEEKLY 6.74); On Training Hedges and Trees as Military Defenses (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 23.64); Tanks as Successors to Cavalry (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 19.133); Votive Offerings and the War (The Classical Journal 13.442)

McKinlay, Caesar Redivivus (The Classical Journal 14.103)

Microw, The War and the Classics (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8.208)

Pease, A Gallic Parallel (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8.168)
Radin, The International Law of the Gallic Campaigns (The Classical Journal 12.8); Modern Military
Effectives and the Nervian Campaign (CLASSICAL
WEEKLY 12.8)

Rolfe, Brutus and the Ships of the Veneti (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 11.106; 136)

Sage, War Ancient and Modern (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 8.136)

Sidey, Agrippina as an Army Nurse (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 12.61)

Slaughter, Woodrow Wilson's Letter on the Teaching of Caesar (The Classical Journal 21.3)

Smith, Centurio Romanus, a First-class Fighting Man (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 22.17)

Spaulding, The Ancient Military Writers (The Classical Journal 28.657); The Classical Elements in the German War Plan of 1914 (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 18.142); Warfare Ancient and Modern (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 19.3)

Stout, Training Soldiers for the Roman Legion (The Classical Journal 16.423)

Taylor, Caesar's Rhine Bridge (The Classical Review 16.29)

Ullman, Daylight Saving in Ancient Rome (The Classical Journal 13.450); German Trenches on a Roman Battlefield (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 9.152)

Van Hook, 'Frightfulness' in Ancient Greece (CLASS-ICAL WEEKLY 10.87)

Wightman, A Lee Shore (CLASSICAL WEEKLY 9.130) So deep an interest has been expressed in these notes

So deep an interest has been expressed in these notes and comments on an unfortunately timely subject that it is expected to publish in CLASSICAL WEEKLY soon another group. Contributions of readers are invited.

REVIEWS

The Psychology of Aristotle. An Analysis of the Living Being. By CLARENCE SHUTE. xiv, 148 pages. Columbia University Press, New York 1941 (Columbia Studies in Philosophy, No. 1) \$2

This is a good beginning of the Columbia studies in philosophy. Mr. Shute has given a comprehensive exposition of Aristotle's psychology, drawing his materials not only from De Anima and other strictly psychological works, but from the biological treatises and the Nicomachean Ethics as well. In view of the fact that Aristotle himself bases his psychology on biology, and particularly in view of the amount of psychological analysis that is given in the Ethics, such treatment is very timely. The contributions from these various sources are excellently welded together and form a fairly consistent and full picture of Aristotelian psychology. The first two chapters cover the strictly biological portion, the generation and growth of the organism. The third chapter, The Initiation and Control of Behavior, relates to desire and practical intelligence. Chapter IV discusses the critical activities of the organism from sensation to theoretical reason, while the fifth chapter is devoted to the metaphysical implications of Aristotle's psychology. An excellent "analytical outline" of the contents of the book is given in the appendix. There is a good index, and throughout the work are given adequate citations from Aristotle's works and references to them. There seems to be an oversight, or misprint, in the bottom line of page 104. In discussing the five intellectual virtues of the Ethics and their division into powers of the scientific or of the calculative function, the sentence ends, "the second and third are powers of the calculative," where it should state, "the first and third."

Although, as has been stated, Mr. Shute's work is an excellent survey of Aristotle's psychological doctrines in their entirety, it can hardly be called the true picture of the great Stagyrite's teachings on the subject, but only a true picture which interprets Aristotle in terms of modern biological psychology. Emphasis is laid on those phases of his teaching which make biology the central core and explanation of psychological functions and which fit into an evolutionary philosophy of interacting organisms and environment. This is probably natural, and perhaps legitimate, in interpreting an ancient philosopher, to show what truth there is in his doctrines from a modern standpoint. However, it seems to the reviewer that "appetence" or desire should not have been treated prior to sensation, nor practical reason to pure reason; that Aristotle's distinction between plant soul, animal soul and rational soul with their respective final goals of reproduction, pleasure and knowledge, should have been stressed a little more; that the separateness and distinctness of different species is somewhat slurred over; and that a little too much emphasis is placed on those parts of his teaching which fit in best with an evolutionary naturalism and a psychology of "organism and environment," adjustment, action, interaction and adaptation. This is not a serious criticism, however, as Aristotle himself certainly shows some of these traits in his psychological teachings.

A somewhat more serious criticism is that the book throws little light on those two prime difficulties of Aristotelianism, the nature of sensation and the distinction between the active and the passive reason. The latter difficulty is dealt with more adequately on page 130, where Mr. Shute concludes that the "separated, deathless, eternal" mind is "not a purely personal, individual matter, but is the intelligible order of the world in which the man as a whole participates while he is a living being." This is not an implausible interpretation of Aristotle, though other interpretations might well have been cited. Professor Ross, for example, does not seem to hold this view in his Aristotle (149ff.), and shows Aristotelian evidence for a more individualistic view of the active reason. However, we should perhaps not demand of Mr. Shute the solution of this Aristotelian puzzle which seems never to have been adequately solved. What Aristotle himself thought on the subject can from his writings hardly be determined in a definite sense.

The second difficulty is somewhat more serious. In many passages Aristotle does indicate that sense-qualities, e.g. color, are the actualization of the mutual potentialities of both the object and the sensing organism. This is the solution that Mr. Shute adopts, and it indicates that color and presumably all other sense-qualities are not qualities of objects in themselves, but a product of the mutual interaction of organism and environment. This view, however, does not seem consistent with other passages in Aristotle which describe sensation as the 'receiving of the sensible form" of objects without their matter. Coupled with the well-known principle of priority of the actual to the potential, this latter view indicates that sense-qualities are characteristics of objects quite independently of the knowing organism. Mr. Shute does not give an adequate account of these epistemological difficulties.

The above criticisms are not serious strictures on the value of the book. As has been stated, it is an excellent survey of the Aristotelian psychology and in many points quite illuminating. Only one feels that there might have been some greater expansion to discuss the various problems roused by seeming contradictions and vaguenesses in the Aristotelian doctrines. Perhaps these difficulties may yet be solved, as they have been to some extent in the case of Plato, by a historical treatment of the development of Aristotle's thought, somewhat after the manner of Jaeger's Aristotle. The full material for such a treatment has not yet been

assembled, however, and Mr. Shute is therefore perhaps justified in following the traditional treatment of Aristotle which, in lack of historical evidence, treats his philosophy as though it sprang full-blown from his mind like Minerva from the head of Jove.

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Latin and the Romans. Book Two. By Thornton Jenkins and Anthony Pelzer Wagener. xiv, 585 pages, ill. Ginn, Boston 1942 \$2.12

This textbook, which supersedes the popular Gray & Jenkins Latin for Today, is not a revision but is, on the contrary, a new book. Several of the characteristics of the older book, such as similarity of reading selections in some of the units and presentation of vocabularies, have been retained.

The seventy lessons of this book are incorporated into five units: I The Coming of the Trojan Ancestors of the Romans to Italy; II The Building of the Roman State; III Rome's Early Foreign Wars; IV Great Leaders of the Republic; V The Creation of a Roman Province. The plan of the book is similar to that of Book One of the same series.

In Unit I we find a review of the forms and principles of grammar covered in the first year of Latin. The selections for reading which form the foundation of this unit relate the wanderings and adventures of Aeneas. Units II, III and IV consist of reading selections, in English and Latin, which trace the "course of Roman history and the development of political and social institutions from the founding of the city to the consulship of Julius Caesar" (iv). The grammar in these sections is devoted to the subjunctive mood, gerunds and gerundives, further uses of the ablative, and other such developments.

The study of Caesar's Commentaries forms the basis of work in Unit V. Lessons 31-70 include selections from the Helvetian campaign, the raid on Ariovistus, the first invasion of Britain, and the final rebellion of the Gauls. In this unit the discussion of grammar, which has been reduced to a minimum, covers the active and passive periphrastics, genitive and ablative of description, subjunctive with cum in concessive clauses, and subordinate clauses and sequence of tenses in indirect statements.

Throughout the entire book there is a great wealth of reading material. As in Book One each lesson contains, besides a basic reading selection, an extra story that can be used for diversion or for additional credit or in any manner a teacher wishes. The auxiliary reading selections are lacking, however, in the lessons of Unit I because this subdivision provides a review of earlier work. Those in Units II, III and IV are taken from

Pliny's Letters, from mythology, from mediaeval literature, and from other sources. One selection relates in simplified form the story of Pullo and Vorenus, those two famous rivals whose rash deed is so often missed because of its position in the Commentaries. Those who desire more reading in mythology will find the fast moving story of Jason's adventures in the supplementary readings of Unit V. Additional readings consist of further cullings from the Gallic Wars. The vast amount and the varied content of this reading material should fill the needs of the most exacting teacher or of the most brilliant class.

The teacher will find a review of the first-year vocabulary in the first ten lessons of Unit I. Into each lesson from 11 to 70 new vocabularies are introduced with an ever decreasing number of words.

The number, the variety, and the excellence of the many illustrations might well serve as a subject for review. By means of drawings, views, maps, movie scenes and pictures of monuments, wall paintings, statues and vases, we see Roman life and Roman conquests unfolding before our eyes. Such a pageant of life and color few textbooks have presented before.

The authors have, as they state, placed less emphasis on Latin prose composition in this book than in Book One. Teachers will find a fair amount of work of this type in the body of Book Two and for those who desire more work in writing Latin the authors have placed Additional Exercises in the Writing of Latin on pages 509-14.

Derivative exercises form a part of the lessons in Units II, III and IV.

A complete list of paradigms (471-98) and a full grammatical summary (499-508) with a vocabulary sufficient for complete use of the book (515-77) are provided.

The type is clear and the text is set one column to the page. The reviewer personally prefers two columns to the page in order to lessen eye strain.

There are several interesting features: the series of English readings under the heading of Roman Background, brief and concise sketches written in an interesting—one might say, in a charming—manner; a close correlation of Caesar's deeds and Roman devices with those of today, e.g., a picture (331) of the Maginot Line at the place where Caesar fought Ariovistus, a picture of a modern battleship and one of Caesar's (383), maps of the invasion of Britain by Caesar and that attempted by Hitler (388-9), a picture of tank traps with the same aim as Caesar's devices before Alesia (459).

All in all, the book is excellent and well adapted to the needs of all second-year classes.

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ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES

This department is conducted by Dr. Charles T. Murphy of Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. Correspondence concerning abstracts may be addressed to him.

ANCIENT AUTHORS

Homer. WILHELM BÜCHNER. Die Penelopessenen in der Odyssee. The role of Penelope in the Odyssey is treated under the following five headings: the trick in weaving as described by Antinous, Penelope herself and Amphimedon; the queen's laughter in Book 18; the test of the bow; the recognition scene; the so-called epic irony. The repetitions are characteristic of Homeric technique and serve to emphasize Penelope's cleverness. Thus she laughs when she realizes that the suitors can be duped into bringing gifts as payment for their insolence in contending for her hand, for she has become convinced that her husband is near home. Since Odysseus alone had the prowess to shoot an arrow through the twelve axes, Penelope had no doubts as to the outcome of the test with the bow. Even in the recognition scene Penelope dominates the situation and teases Odysseus into revealing his identity. The double meaning contained in many of Penelope's utterances has been incorrectly defined as "irony"; such ambigui-ties are better described as bits of unconscious contrast. Similarly, the Aristotelian term περιπέτεια is suggested to describe actions which produce the opposite results of those intended. H 75 (1940) 337-68

FRIEDRICH KLINGER. Über die Dolonie. Apparent inconsistencies in the Dolonia are examined and explained as peculiar to the author of that narrative. Contrast between Greeks and Trojans and sudden changes of fortune play a more important part in the Dolonia than elsewhere in the Iliad. Stylistically the author of the Dolonia has a fondness for clothing small topics in high phrases. Although there are similar scenes in the Odyssey, the Dolonia is best described as resembling the piece of poetry from the late period of the old epic, the Shield of Heracles, which has come down under the name of Hesiod. An appendix compares two passages of the Dolonia with strikingly similar passages from the Odyssey: K 243 and a 65, K 297f. and v 300f., v 393f.

H 75 (1940) 337-38 (Kirk)

EDUARD SCHWARTZ. Der Name Homeros. The name Homer came to be applied to the epic tradition when the poems were written and circulated among the rhapsodists. It signified any epic which the rhapso-dists recited as "Homeric" and the copies of which were entitled 'Ομήρου. Homer is a genuine personal name, but it can never have been the name of an individual poet. A rhapsodist of the name must actually have lived and become famous at a time when part of the epic had received permanent form but when the rhapsodists still made some additions. Why this particular rhapsodist's name gained such widespread recognition is an unsolvable puzzle with our present information. Hesiod was also a rhapsodist, but he gave the epic so new a content that he impressed his name on his fellowcitizens. H 75 (1940) 1-9

Vergil. R. BEUTLER. Zur Komposition von Vergils Georgica, I 43-159. This is a detailed study pointed by constant reference to the composition as a whole. Such a study of a fairly large connected passage is offered

for the purpose of throwing light on the Vergilian plan

in general. The passage discussed is shown to aim at the amplification of a fundamental law disclosing the deeper sense of the practical precepts of nature. This tying up of the individual detail with the law of nature underlying it is characteristic of the Georgics.

H 75 (1940) 410-21 (Kirk)

ART. ARCHAEOLOGY

MILNE, MARJORIE J. A Corinthian Jar with Inscriptions. A vase from Corinth with handles in the form of women's heads, dated about 550 B.C., is rare, possibly unique because of the presence of inscriptions. Under each head is scratched, in the Corinthian alphabet, the name of a girl: Himero, Charita, and Iopa. If these were intended as names of real people, further proof is afforded of how far the Greeks of the mid-sixth century B.C. were from any idea of portraiture, for the two intact heads and presumably the third, the face of which is missing, were made from the same mold. The three names taken together recall Hesiodic descriptions of nymphs, especially the catalogue of nereids. Since in the fifth century women's toilet boxes were adorned with pictures of nereids, the three heads may possibly be those of nereids. Otherwise they must be those of courtesans, i.e. temple servants of the Corinthian Aphrodite.

BMM 37 (1942) 36-7 (Panetta)

RICHTER, GISELA M. A. An Archaic Greek Mirror. This bronze mirror, 34 cm. in height, consists of a disk, convex in front and concave at the rear, to which was soldered a female statuette which served as a handle. The figure is nude, except for a diazoma, of vigorous physique, and grasps in its upraised hands the tails of two recumbent lions which decorate the voluted at-tachment, supported by the head, into which the disk is fitted. The style and rendering of the figure date the mirror about 540 B.c. The diazoma identifies the girl as an acrobat but offers no evidence of where the mirror was made. It is not known where the mirror was found. It has been listed in the sale catalogue of J. Gréau, dated June 9, 1885. Eleven years later it appeared in the sale catalogue of the collection of "Chevalier M." S. Reinach included a small drawing of it in his Répertoire de la statuaire grecque et romaine (1908). In 1940 it was published by K. Schefold in Die Antike. BMM 38 (1942) 150-2 (Panetta)

PHILOSOPHY. RELIGION

HAILPERIN, HERMAN. Saadia's Relation to Islamic and Christian Thought. Saadia (882-942) intended his greatest work, Book of Philosophic Doctrines and Religious Beliefs, written in Arabic in 933, as a work in comparison, identification and harmonization of the elements of thought of the peoples around him, Jewish, Islamic, and Christian. The divisions of the work indicate the acquaintance of this mediaeval Jewish thinker with the scholastics of Islam; the critical comments on the Christian Trinity, the abrogations of the Jewish Law by Christian and Muslim, and the Christian view of the Messianic fulfillment illustrate his familiarity with Christian doctrines and beliefs. Intimately concerned with occult knowledge, Saadia exerted a strong in-fluence on Eleazer of Worms who became, in the thirteenth century, the leading exponent of Jewish esoteric doctrine. The writings of Saadia also influenced, notably in Spain in the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, the interpretations of the scriptures among Christians, especially as to providence, eschatology, and magical significations. Historia Judaica 4.1 (1942) 2-16 (Panetta)